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 The name Jean-François Lyotard rightly evokes a “postmodern” strain of 
Twentieth Century French philosophy, sceptical of grand narratives and emancipatory 
political projects as such. In a retrospective introduction to his book on the Algerian 
war of independence, Lyotard claims that all truly revolutionary perspectives are 
finished (Lyotard, 1989), and that the principle of a radical alternative to capitalism 
must be abandoned (1989). Marxism in particular persists for the postmodern Lyotard 
only as a “feeling of the differend” (Lyotard, 1988), a style of listening to radical 
injustice, and it must remain hyper-vigilant against its becoming substantive and 
systematic. Marxism, in short, becomes purely critical and is neither a privileged mode 
of discourse nor emancipatory in the postmodern reading. This sheds light on why, 
with a few notable exceptions,1 commentators have downplayed or ignored Lyotard’s 
early period of council communist, anti-colonial and campus militancy, relegating the 
latter to an immature stage, a biographical curiosity or a historical footnote of the 
secondary literature. Against this current, some Lyotard scholars have begun to build 
a case that there is greater philosophical substance in the early works, as well as 
greater continuity between the early and the late, than might first be apparent.   
 In what follows, we will contribute to this project of interpretive reassessment 
by mapping Lyotard’s critique of Louis Althusser. We will suggest that, far from being 
a minor episode in Lyotard’s corpus, it may be read as a kind of philosophical hinge. 
More precisely, in polemicizing with Althusser through a tour-de-force reading of Marx, 
Lyotard plots out the trajectory of his pagan, postmodern and late periods while 
clinging to the last remnants of his commitment to traditional political activism. Not 
only does Lyotard’s drift from Marxism become clearer in light of his critique of 
Althusser, but we can detect therein the continuities and transformations underlying 
what some commentators have (all too facilely) passed off as a radical break. 
Unfortunately, Lyotard’s Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud, which collects essays 
surrounding the Nanterre revolt, has been translated into English as the highly 
abridged Driftworks (Semiotext(e), 1984) – the latter missing the one-hundred page 
plus centrepiece, “La place de l’aliénation dans le retournement marxiste” – precisely, 
Lyotard’s critique of Althusser and, as Claire Pagès rightly points out in a work 
devoted to the topic, his most important text with respect to alienation (Lyotard et 
l’aliénation, Paris: PUF 2011: 36). This text of Lyotard’s practically begs for sustained 
                                                           
1 We are thinking here of Amparo Vega, whose Le premier Lyotard (Paris: Harmattan 2010) is a 
carefully considered overview of the early Lyotard; also notable is Claire Pagès, who has tracked the 
fortunes of alienation from beginning to end of Lyotard’s career in Lyotard et l’aliénation (Paris: PUF 
2011), and whose edited work Lyotard à Nanterre (Paris: Klincksieck 2010) revisits Lyotard’s political 
role at that school. Crome and Williams in their Lyotard Reader and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2006) also provide a decent overview of the main facts and philosophical 
significance of the early period. Finally, PUF has contributed to interest in the early period by 
publishing Pourquoi Philosopher? (2012), Lyotard’s 1964 introductory course in philosophy at the 
Sorbonne. 
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English language commentary; the following essay performs the humbler task of 
mapping out, in broad outlines, its purpose, its form and its contents before 
commenting upon its place in Lyotard’s development. A very substantial question – 
namely, whether or not Lyotard’s critique of Althusser is on point – deserves a much 
longer study. This said, we will flag points of philosophical interest and tension as the 
sketch develops.      
 We hope that our text will be read in the spirit of a collegial continuation of the 
aforementioned and promising work undertaken by Claire Pagès on the topic of 
Lyotard and alienation, inasmuch as it seeks to a) perform an exegesis of a text she 
rightly flags as extremely important with regard to the topic, and b) contribute to the 
linking up of disparate parts of Lyotard’s corpus by means of the interpretive key of 
alienation. Any misreadings, omissions and inaccuracies that may have escaped our 
notice are of course our own.  
 We have organized what follows into five sections. First, we will briefly put the 
Althusser dispute into its historical and philosophical context. Second, we will outline 
Althusser’s views on alienation as expressed in For Marx, which serve as the object of 
Lyotard’s critique. Third, we will perform an exegesis of Lyotard’s critique. Fourth, we 
will briefly sum up our exegesis. Finally, we will link the dispute to themes in the 
mature Lyotard, suggesting continuity where others have situated a break.  
I. Lyotard’s Intervention in Context 
We can begin by lending some precision to the notion of “Lyotard’s early 
militancy”. The long period between Lyotard’s first book, La phénomenologie (1954) and 
his published soutenance, Discours, figure (1971) was devoted to revolutionary activity – 
first as a member of the post-Trotskyist Socialisme ou barbarie, then splinter group 
Pouvoir ouvrier, and finally, as a politically autonomous professor organizing with 
students at Nanterre. This period was punctuated by trenchant, illuminating and 
precise analyses of the class composition and political situations in Algeria and 
metropolitan France.  
In “The State and Politics of the France of 1960”, included in the Lyotard Reader 
and Guide, editors Crome and Williams (2006) suggest that “since the Socialisme ou 
Barbarie analysis was already a limit extension of Marxism, arriving after successive 
refinements, there was little room to manoeuvre in terms of claiming that the failure 
[of the prediction that the Algerian war would produce an economic and social 
revolution] was due to a rectifiable error in revolutionary theory. Any disillusionment 
with the politics of the group would have to lead to a radically new way of thinking 
about the political” (Crome and Williams, Ed., 2006). By Marxist criteria, the Algerian 
revolution did fail, and the group did in fact splinter in 1964, precipitated by decidedly 
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un-Marxist theses advanced by Cornelius Castoriadis in 1959 (Lyotard, 2006). Lyotard 
had displayed a similar estrangement from the basic categories of even Socialisme ou 
Barbarie’s supposedly limit-case Marxism by 1960, writing of the increasing distaste of 
the proletariat for “worn-out organizations” of the Left, but more fundamentally, 
decisively, and originally even, for “the political sphere itself” (Lyotard, 2006). This is 
but an early expression of his postmodern view that the political is no longer “the 
privileged site where the intractable makes itself heard.”(Lyotard, 1989)  
Though continuing in the orbit of post-Trotskyist critique for another six years 
with Socialisme ou Barbarie and then Pouvoir ouvrier, it is indeed towards an “a-politics”,2 
an ultra-leftist (or better, post-leftist) rejection of the political sphere as such that 
Lyotard would increasingly drift.3 In a retrospective preface to the 1994 edition of 
Derive à partir de Marx et Freud, Lyotard explains how the student “mouvement du 22 
mars” took inspiration from Socialisme ou Barbarie’s radical Marxist orientation. 
Accordingly, he “cooperated” – though he claims his heart wasn’t in it – in 
accomplishing the practical-critical tasks that the situation (and “honor”) required 
(Lyotard, 1994). Lyotard details how even while in the trenches with students, 
privately he passed from an orientation of “liberation” to one of “resistance” – a rear-
guard position, almost defeatist – and how he shifted analytical terrain from 
revolutionary political violence to literary, aesthetic violence (Lyotard, 1994).  
The nature of this shift, as will become apparent below, is linked to the critique 
of Althusser. In and around the time of the Nanterre revolt – but also earlier, as 
evidenced by the 1964 lecture course collected in Why Philosophize? – Lyotard was 
experimenting with fusions of, but also critical departures from, Marx and 
Freud/Lacan. As such, the notion of “resistance” to which he here refers was already 
inflected by its Freudian handling, according to which the unconscious remains 
opaque to conscious thought, while the latter remains obstinately blind to the former’s 
manifestations (Lyotard, 1994). Art and literary writing testify to the violence of this 
resistance, without exactly being its symptom, which sheds light on Lyotard’s 
increasing aestheticism (Lyotard, 1994). But more broadly construed, resistance is set 
against the concept of reality that Lyotard argues runs through all of Freud’s work 
(Lyotard, 1973): “un ensemble lié de perceptions vérifiables par des activités de 
transformation, et aussi signifiables par des ensembles liés de mots, c’est-à-dire, 
verbalisables” (Lyotard, 1973) (“a collection of perceptions that are testable against 
                                                           
2 The introduction to Lyotard’s Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud (translated as “Adrift” in Driftworks) 
admirably captures this rejection of reformative and revolutionary politics as such, and the adoption 
of a stance that is activist, but not recognizably political or of the order of the political, “pas 
politique”. See also p. 202-209 of the first edition from Union Générale d’Éditions, which contains 
the article “Nanterre, ici et maintenant”. 
3 Note that in 1973, Lyotard claims that his drift had begun as far back as the early 1950s (1973: 16).  
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each other, as well as testable by means of practical activity, and that are also able to 
be put into language”). For Freud, the criteria of reality are essentially criteria of 
communication (Lyotard, 1973); objects are “real” only to the extent that they can be 
communicated through language and practice (Lyotard, 1973). Freudian reality is at 
once skeletal, social by nature and provisional (Lyotard, 1973), being overdetermined 
and undermined by that which escapes communication (in general, primary psychic 
process or the unconscious or the death drive, but more particularly the dream-work 
and that which remains intractable in perceptions, affects, and aesthetic gestures) 
(Lyotard, 1973).  
The figural – a key concept in Discours, figure, but already operant in the 
Nanterre writings – is important in the articulation of resistance, being that which 
underpins and erupts into the thin framework of Freudian reality, indicating but never 
communicating or directly showing the non-place of the unconscious. The figure is an 
intensity, or rather the singularity of the particular event, felt or experienced as an 
inarticulate trace (i.e. experienced as an affect rather than a pairing of sense/referent). 
The figural can be conceived in terms of the dream-work, the radical alterity which 
works the dream material, or at a further abstraction, the death drive, whose irony is 
to create myriad thriving complex forms through secondary elaboration, on its 
ceaseless path to annihilation. By drawing on Freud in this manner, Lyotard sketches a 
social ontology in which structures of meaning are provisional accretions of a deeper, 
strictly ungraspable and unmanageable libidinal work. While technically his ontology is 
monist, Lyotard is construing society according to a dualism of surface and depth.  
Political spontaneism appears to lurk at the bottom of Lyotard’s drift, since the 
source of political/aesthetic energy is prior to or “beneath” the field of contestation. 
One drifts, after all, on a current one doesn’t control. Lyotard’s position is to this 
extent also tailist, since it remains to the intellectual to lag behind and map out the 
spontaneous eruptions of the figural (McLennan, 2013). But through self-criticism 
Lyotard detects and expunges the Hegelian residues of this spontaneism/tailism, 
giving himself over, in Nietzschean inspiration, to a kind of political/aesthetic 
voluntarism and adventurism. As such, the libidinal drift ends in a celebration of the 
inherent potential of capitalism to conduct intensities, and an accelerationist program 
of actually conducting them on an active-nihilist, purely voluntaristic basis. Thus from 
the Freudo-Marxist drift away from liberation and towards resistance, Lyotard 
eventually established the (ill-fated, later largely disavowed) antihumanist/anti-critical 
militant philosophy which would receive its fullest and most aporetic expression in 
Libidinal Economy (1974).    
It may of course be objected that things are not quite so simple; Lyotard’s 
political position in the years of drift cannot be “tailist” because it does not appear to 
be, strictly speaking, a political position at all. But this would beg a definition of 
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“politics”, as the contestation of a situation, i.e. the state of a field of discourse / 
communication / representation: in Freudian terms, contesting a given state of reality, 
usually in the name of a counterfactual state of reality that is claimed to be more just 
or in some other way superior. As any reader of Rosa Luxemburg knows, there are 
two broadly-construed ways of going about this: reform and revolution. Lyotard’s 
drift program troubles the very alternative, since it tends toward the contestation of 
reality as such. The a-politics of Lyotard’s position is therefore not the taking or 
dissolving of power, a given state of reality, by reformist or revolutionary means. 
Rather, it is the thoroughgoing rejection of politics as a field of representation and 
therefore, of meaningful action. Such an a-politics, in outline, accords with Lyotard’s 
career-long methodological materialism,4 i.e. his philosophy of the event. But it also 
describes, for Lyotard, what was genuinely novel about the protests of May 68 and the 
March 22nd movement. Finally – and most importantly of all for our purposes – such 
an a-politics, as we will see below, conceives of the scene of politics as radically and 
thoroughly alienated.  
With the preceding in mind, a clash or settling of accounts with Louis 
Althusser – French master of Marxist philosophy, leading theoretical antihumanist, 
and penetrating reader of Freud/Lacan – was both inevitable and, as we hope to 
show, of considerable interest in the interpretation of Lyotard. The year of publication 
of his intervention in Les Temps Modernes is autumn 1969; the broad historical context 
is the apparent failure (in strictly revolutionary terms) of May 68 and the fresh 
memory of the obfuscating, if not flatly counter-revolutionary role played in those 
events by the French Communist Party (PCF), to which Althusser belonged as a 
leading (though far from dogmatic) theoretician. Althusser had by this time published 
his two major works, the magisterial For Marx and (with students who would go on to 
carve out their own names in French philosophy) Reading Capital. Lenin and Philosophy 
had also appeared. Althusser’s philosophical programme for a scientific Marxism 
purged of Hegelian, teleological, idealistic and humanistic residues was well 
established and well known by this point. His “self-criticism”, contained in an 
otherwise merciless reply to British communist John Lewis – wherein he identified a 
“theoreticist” tendency in his own works and conceded the presence (but hardly the 
importance) of such Hegelian residues as “alienation” in the mature Marx – was still 
three years off. 
 The historical setting is telling. Althusser was at the centre of fierce disputes 
over the meaning of Marx’s texts, the role of the party, and the relation of Marxism to 
philosophy. But insofar as the Lyotard of 1969 was bathed in the antihumanism of his 
milieu, he cannot at face value be said to have taken issue with Althusser’s dismissal of 
                                                           
4 Cf. James Williams, Lyotard: Towards a Postmodern Philosophy. Cambridge and Malden, Polity Press / 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998. 
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the concept of alienation on humanistic grounds. Indeed, Lyotard’s position by that 
point little resembled the humanistic Marxism of a Jean-Paul Sartre or a John Lewis. 
And as he notes explicitly in his retrospective preface to Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud, 
it is not just Althusser’s “epistemological purification” which is attacked therein, but 
also the humanistic Marxism of Maximilien Rubel (Lyotard, 1994). Essentially, we find 
a fellow antihumanist attacking Althusser on the grounds that alienation is both 
crucial to Marxism, and that it needn’t be read in humanistic terms. Granted, the 
Lyotard of 1969 was not the Lyotard of 1974, for whom alienation and even critique 
itself would indeed be read wholesale as humanistic, Hegelian, nihilistic residues. But 
regardless of Lyotard’s later about-face, the intervention against Althusser strives to 
preserve the concept of alienation within a theoretically antihumanist Marxist 
position.  
 
 
II.   The Object of Lyotard’s Intervention: Althusser on Alienation 
In the section ‘To My English Readers’ of For Marx, Althusser claims that there 
are two events in the history of actually existing communism that had come dominate 
communist and leftist intellectual discourse since the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. He 
is speaking of the Sino-Soviet split and the criticism of the cult of personality 
surrounding Stalin (Althusser, 1969). He notes that the following work is formed and 
informed by this conjuncture and should be understood as such. While he 
acknowledges the importance of the break between the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Soviet Communist Party, the critique of the cult of personality is the crucial 
event because it is within this critique that Althusser recognizes the emergence of the 
humanism he comes to analyse and ultimately reject. The questionable existence of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat had passed, opening up new possibilities for the 
beginnings of a form of humanist ‘liberation’. This liberation, perhaps better termed a 
liberalizing movement, was understood in communist intellectual circles as a struggle 
against Stalinist dogmatism, undergirded by a renewed interest in and adoption of the 
works of early Marx, using a philosophy of man all but abandoned by Marx as his 
work matured. 
 The theme of the alienation of man rests upon the theoretical humanism of the 
works of the early Marx. Alienation, as a concept, is one gleaned from both Hegel and 
Feuerbach, and is generally understood as the mystification of man from his true 
nature or essence, preventing self-actualization and self-knowledge. The Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 establish the rudiments of a system built around a 
theory of alienation.  In For Marx, Althusser includes a glossary of terms, presenting 
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the specific definitions he operationalizes in his work. Alienation is included in this 
section, and is defined specifically as a state in which the true nature or essence of 
man is present only in the form of a malformed or distorted God, which is created in 
the image of human species being, and perceived as “an external, pre-existing creator” 
(Althusser, 1969). This is this same conceptual mechanism that undergirds Marx’s 
political and economic critique. The State and its economic infrastructure, in and 
through the confiscation of “real self-determining labour” (Althusser,1969) from the 
proletariat, function as alienating forces that mask people from themselves, pushing 
any knowledge of a Spirit-Being to a ‘beyond’, out of reach and distorted. Alienation 
becomes the category under which estrangement, lack, and absence of worth and 
meaning fall, producing a mystification of the self from the Self. The Spirit-Being of 
the writings of Young Marx could never be self-actualised, could never recognise itself 
while existing as an alienated being.  
 Necessary to any notion of alienation is this Spirit-Being, or essence of man 
that is mystified from itself in the form of a conceptual proletariat. Althusser 
maintains that under the lens of the mature Marx’s work, the concept of alienation 
becomes incoherent as the humanism and idealism of his Young Hegelian work falls 
away and gives ground to Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Althusser’s claim is 
stronger than that alienation qua humanism is an ideological category and can and 
should be abandoned within Marxist discourse. His claim is that by the time Marx 
embarked on Capital, alienation, like the theoretical humanism it rests upon, is no 
longer present in Marx’s work outside of ironical usage or an entirely different 
theoretical content.   
 Althusser’s critique and subsequent rejection of alienation as a rigorous 
category is hinged upon this rejection of humanism in total. His reading of Marx, and 
of Marxism in general, divides the work of the philosopher into two parts centered on 
the writing of The German Ideology, which represents a total coupure épistemologique, an 
epistemological break. Prior to this break Marx was not yet a Marxist ; his work 
remained firmly within the terrain of ideology. The early Marx is mired in humanism, 
committed to a philosophy of man, which includes work on his alienation. For 
Althusser, this fissure indicates the inherent idealism of these early theoretical 
commitments, noting their ‘haunting’ by Hegel and Hegelian principles. By the time 
of the writing of The German Ideology with Friedrich Engels in 1845, Marx had turned 
away from his earlier philosophical commitments, finally adopting the scientific stance 
that would be the foundation of his later work.  
 The epistemological break Althusser illuminates is the critical moment and 
cannot be overlooked for Althusser’s rejection of alienation. More than just 
recognition of his being mistaken or unsound, the claim is that after 1845, Marx leaves 
these theoretical strands out of his work entirely as the nature of his work 
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transformed. He has abandoned a philosophy of man, under which alienation is a 
rigorous category, as the foundation of his work. The later Marx has settled accounts 
with his former theoretical humanist and idealist tendencies, and while there is the 
possibility of certain vestiges remaining, these early philosophical forays are no longer 
the basis or engine of Marx’s philosophy or politics. The Young Hegelian has been 
inverted, and replaced by the Marxist and all that was abstract philosophy turned to 
science.  
In his analysis of this epistemic break, Althusser locates three elements that 
cannot be delinked from each other. Firstly, the later Marx forms a new theory of 
politics and history based on new structures and categories. These emergent 
categories include productive forces, relations of production, ideologies, 
superstructures, and others that have come to be central to the theoretical apparatus 
of Marxism. Secondly, this new theoretical apparatus discarded any philosophy of 
man, presenting “a radical critique of the theoretical pretensions of every 
philosophical humanism” (Althusser, 1969) Thirdly, and critically, in this radical 
critique, to follow Althusser, humanism itself is rendered an ideology, and thus, 
subsumed under the new categories that define the work of the later Marx. With these 
three elements functioning together in Marx’s work, any (bourgeois) philosophy was 
confined to and bounded by the assumptive logic of a philosophy of man. The ethical, 
aesthetic, economic and political convictions—and their concomitant projects—that 
flowed from a philosophy of man hinged on the coherence and rigour of such a 
theoretical structure.  
There was a commitment to thinking via humanism within Marx’s early work, 
and in the complementary and competing discourses of Marx’s contemporaries. 
However, despite the use of a philosophy of man as theoretical and discursive 
scaffolding for ethical, aesthetic, economic, and political logics, humanism as a 
structure and structuring logic, its internal mechanisms and its theoretical results were 
rarely, if ever, interrogated. The epistemic break that separates the early from the late 
Marx for Althusser inaugurates the sustained interrogation of humanism as one of 
various competing ideologies and relegates notions like alienation to the realm of 
ideology, among superstructural outpourings that flow from the economic base of 
capitalism. 
 Like Marx himself, Althusser does not accept the notion that the recognition or 
knowledge of an ideology entails its collapse.  The knowledge that humanism, despite 
its theoretical cohesion and rigour, is itself an ideology – not a given and wholly 
transparent epistemological basis – does not lead directly to its destruction, as is clear 
in the revival of the work of young Marx. Because Marx’s works are so frequently 
taken in total, with the early works understood as direct precursors to the later works, 
the ideological problematic of humanism, and thereby alienation, is still present and at 
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work in communist political and philosophical discourse. In denying even the 
presence of these ideological concepts in the works of the later Marx, Althusser can 
and does utterly reject alienation as integral and crucial to the continued project of 
really existing communism. 
III. Outlines of Lyotard’s Intervention 
 So how, then, does the Lyotard of 1969 propose to retain the concept of 
alienation as a keystone of Marxist thought, while remaining within an antihumanist 
framework – that is, without falling purely and simply into Hegelianism and/or some 
variant of Marxist humanism? How, in other words, does he take Althusser to task 
from within a broadly similar orbit? 
 Lyotard prefaces his analysis by claiming Althusser’s discourse is critical in 
terms of its content, but non-critical relative to its current situation (or position) in 
historical reality (Lyotard, 1994). In failing to put alienation in its proper place, there is 
a blind spot in the signified of Althusser’s discourse and it is therefore non-critical and 
edifying (Lyotard, 1994). In order to demonstrate how Lyotard arrives at this 
conclusion, we will first provide an exegesis of his long text, comprising a) close but 
wherever possible concise English paraphrases of the original French, and b) minimal 
interjections and glosses, where pertinent. We follow this in the next section by an 
argument summary. Lyotard himself divides his argument into three sections and 
thirty-three numbered sub-sections, to which we cleave below. All page numbers refer 
to the 1994 Galilée edition of Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud.  
Section 1 
1. Le schème (p.36-38) 
 Lyotard begins with a text of great importance to Althusser, the third, 
methodological section of the Introduction to Marx’s 1857 Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy (Marx, 1971). Marx therein denounces the Hegelian 
illusion confounding a) the way in which thought appropriates the concrete and b) 
the actual process of the genesis of the concrete itself. Put more plainly, he denies 
that theory and reality are coextensive. He attempts rather to establish the true 
nature of the link between the genesis of reality and the construction of theory. 
Contra Hegel, for Marx theory maintains a certain independence from reality; it is 
not reality’s (self-)expression, but rather signifies it within a semantic field that is, 
ideally, as complete as possible. But Marx goes further in reflecting upon the 
possibility of elaborating the genesis of concepts and categories, from simple to 
more concrete (hence, more complex). He rejects the notion that this “genesis” 
must be couched in history. Rather, he gives really existing capitalism an 
epistemological and methodological privilege, which he illustrates with the 
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concepts of money and labour. Concerning the latter, Marx explains how the 
concept of abstract labour – labour in general – requires for its emergence the rich 
and complex social substrate of modern capitalism. The latter acts as a schema (a 
Kantian term that is not Marx’s own) in which workers circulate, in an indifferent 
way, between different types of work. Theory retains its independence, but is not 
in a position of radical rupture with the social; it articulates the schema, which is a 
“concrete abstraction”. The schema is, differently put, a symptom that indicates 
where the “mole” of criticism is to dig for true universality.  
2. Le double présent (p.38-40) 
Lyotard claims that this relation Marx establishes between the theoretical and the 
concrete carries a great many implications, but restricts his attention to those 
concerning alienation and critique. The Introduction of 1857 clarifies, for Lyotard, 
Marx’s comments in the Afterword to the second German edition of Capital, 
according to which “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by 
no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working 
in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It 
must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within 
the mystical shell” (Marx, 1999). This “turning right side up” is precisely the 
notion of reversal or “retournement” which Lyotard herein reconstructs in its 
relation to alienation. And the rational kernel to which Marx refers is certainly not, 
Lyotard claims, contradiction, conceived as a moment in a substantial dialectic of 
reconciliation. Rather, it is the conceptual dialectic, conceived as the historically static 
or atemporal ensemble of relations obtaining between mutually intelligible terms 
making rational sense of the socio-economic field to which they are linked. 
Crucially, the notion of a rational kernel also covers the relation between the terms 
of the theoretical ensemble and the reality it describes. As such, we may speak of a 
“double present”: a) the temporal present of a historical reality which is the object of 
intuition and of representation, and in which is indicated b) an atemporal possible 
theoretical present or rather a possible universality. This further clarifies Lyotard’s claim 
that for Marx, there is an epistemological privilege of capitalism. In suggesting that 
capitalism was a necessary condition for the writing of Capital, Marx meant that 
only a particular historical present could indicate the theoretical present 
comprising Marxist theory. The relation between the two presents is not a 
dialectical mediation. Rather, Lyotard conceives of it metaphorically as the right 
angle of a horizontal plane (the “real” process of historical development) with a 
vertical plane (the atemporal “process” of conceptual elaboration from intuitions 
and representations). The meeting of these two planes – the striking of this right 
angle – can of course be missed, blocked, and so on. But there remains the 
inherent possibility of an intelligible present in the referential present of really 
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existing capitalism (or: the possibility of the theoretical present in the historical 
present, or perhaps more problematically: the possibility of the subject in the 
object). There is always the possibility of some measure of communication or 
promiscuity between the two presents, and in this sense Marx is no Kantian. But 
the proper measure of this communication must be taken; Marx is no Hegelian 
either. The Hegelian dialectic is a dialectic in and of reality – necessarily historical – 
whereas the Marxist dialectic is atemporal and as such, does not express diachronic 
reality but rather works apart from it, beneath it, reverses it in rendering it 
intelligible. As such, the Marxist dialectic cannot but be critical, since it stands in an 
antagonistic relationship – but a relationship nonetheless – to the concrete.   
3. Le redoublement et le retournement  (p.40-41) 
Lyotard further illustrates the distance that Marx takes from Hegel by expounding 
on the distinction between redoubling (redoublement) and reversing (retournement). The 
problem is that for Hegel, the two presents described above ultimately coincide in 
the unfolding of the Absolute. The theoretical thereby redoubles the real, which is to 
say, repeats or reproduces it in a conceptual form, and therefore justifies it; it re-
signs it in order to resign us to it (Lyotard’s pun). This operation is a sophisticated 
version of what religion and myth already do (and Hegel himself would concur, 
but with a different inflection: myth and religion express in picture-thinking what 
philosophy thinks conceptually). For Marx, by contrast, the task of theory is to 
reverse the concrete, not to redouble it. It must treat the historical present as the 
inverted form of its underlying rationality while reconstructing that rationality. 
Granted, in writing Capital, Marx repeats something of the “real”. But as we have 
seen, this is because there is a measure of communication, a right angle between 
the two presents. As opposed to Hegel, Marx displaces what he repeats in Capital 
through the operation of reversal. This allows him to criticize interpersonal 
relations and their institutionalization under capitalism, whereas Hegel’s operation 
is inherently conservative.  
4. Déictique (p.41-43) 
Lyotard situates Marx with respect to Left-Hegelianism and humanism. He 
describes how Feuerbach, contrary to Marx, reproduces the religious, world-
edifying function of philosophy even while trying to escape it. Feuerbach privileges 
the deictic – any word like “here”, “now”, “I”, “you” or “this” which designates 
something of the concrete while failing to signify anything in the theoretical system. 
The deictic is not a concept, inasmuch as it cannot be given an equivalent 
extension in the theoretical system through other terms. As such, it points beyond 
theory to the non-linguistic, to the properly concrete and, importantly for 
Feuerbach – who lets the Cartesian, humanistic implications of the deictic resonate 
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– the relation between interlocutors. To comprehensively redouble the real, Hegel 
must absorb the deictic into his system, to transform it into a moment of the 
development of the concept. Feuerbach by contrast insists upon its intractability, 
its opacity to theory. But while his philosophy thereby ceases to be religious in the 
sense of a dialectical reconciliation, it remains so in what Lyotard deems a 
reformed or “protestant” sense, precisely by insisting on the anguished retention 
of absence in presence, or more specifically, of the transcendent I-you relation in 
the immanent field. This renders his discourse uncritical because it posits the 
“real” relation between interlocutors – their position – as innocent, unproblematic, 
and ultimately inter-subjective – which is not to say objective. In short, Feuerbach 
criticizes the signified of Hegelian discourse, the absolute mediation, while 
nonetheless mystifying relations between interlocutors. It remains to Marx to go 
further.  
 
 
5. À la fois un déictique et un schème (p.43-46) 
In opposition to Left-Hegelianism, Marx installs his discourse at a certain distance 
from its object. Take for example the fourth thesis on Feuerbach. Feuerbach 
correctly reduces the Holy Family to an ideological expression of the mundane, 
nuclear family – but uncritically accepts that the latter is real. He does not read the 
family as itself an alienation, an experiential inversion that remains to be 
theoretically and practically annihilated. His analysis therefore lacks the distance of 
a science to its field of reference. In this direction – concerning distance, the break, 
the cut in connection to science – it is possible to follow Althusser. But according 
to Lyotard, Althusser fails understand the precise nature of this distance when he 
dismisses or does not recognize a defining feature of Marxist discourse: that the 
referential relation between Marxist speech and its object is an essentially critical one (Pagès, 
2011). Marxist discourse does not simply reflect nor even reconstruct abstractly, but 
rather inverts or reverses the given. This makes it, to quote Pagès, “a theoretical 
system which negates its object by inverting it,” and not “a structural system that 
gives rational shape to the reality under discussion” (2011). Put differently, the 
purely critical function of Marxist discourse is captured in the fact that it articulates 
and negates alienation in the social field; it theoretically inverts a “real” inversion, 
and this latter inversion is what is called alienation. There is thus an 
“epistemological distance” in Marxism that one does not find, for example, in 
structuralist discourse (Althusser perhaps, but most certainly Claude Lévi-Strauss). 
The theoretical system, to be critical, must indicate not only how “reality” can be 
conceptually reconstructed, but also how it might be theoretically annihilated 
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through reversal. This is precisely where we see the importance of alienation in 
Marx’s system. It functions on the one hand, in the object-field, as a schema: it 
signals “real” abstraction, i.e. inversion, as well as the theoretical possibility of 
constructing a non-inverted relation and inverting the inversion. But it also appears 
in the theoretical register – only not as a concept in the mature Marx’s system. To 
this extent, Althusser’s analysis is correct. But Lyotard maintains that alienation is 
present “in another way,” “negatively present”; it operates as a deictic or, more 
accurately, as a quasi-deictic. For example, the theoretical tableau plots out the co-
presence of the use-value and exchange-value of labor, thereby designating 
capitalist “reality” – where exchange-value obscures use-value – as alienated. 
Alienation in theory is therefore a “deictic”, a showing, but only a “quasi-deictic” 
because in showing, it also negates.  
Section 2 
6. Le hazard (p.46-48) 
It now falls to Lyotard to substantiate the claims of the first section. He turns his 
attention to the lived experience of the indifference of labor, and the 
“symptomatic privilege” this has in Marx’s system. He claims that the recognition 
and the use of its indexing function is a “methodological constant” of Marx’s 
work. Marx always affirmed the lived experience in capitalism of a schema 
indicating a possible theoretical and practical universality. As such, the real rupture 
between the period of 1843-48 and the Introduction of 1857 does not, as 
Althusser maintains, take shape in the banishment of alienation from Marx’s 
system, but rather, the cleavage Marx establishes between alienation’s phenomenal 
and theoretical registers. In the earlier period, Marx more or less identifies the 
experience of alienation with its concept, cleaving as he does to a notion of 
essence and appearance inherited from Hegel. Later, he retains alienation in 
experience as a symptom while maintaining that its theoretical elaboration 
annihilates it. To substantiate these claims, Lyotard examines how the rupture 
plays out in Marx’s handling of the notion of “chance” (accident, contingency) 
from the earlier to the later writings.   
7. Un Faktum qui soit un Begriff? (p.48-50) 
Lyotard does not want to claim however that the young Marx was 
unproblematically Hegelian. Far from it; he identifies in the Parisian manuscripts 
of 1844 the “most remarkable” early configuration of the double present. Against 
Althusser he maintains that the text is not fundamentally Hegelian, inasmuch as its 
method is not Hegelian. Contrary to Hegel, who engenders appearance from essence 
(the concrete from the concept), Marx proceeds “inversely from appearances.” 
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Take private property for example. Hegel starts from the false, abstract universality 
of property as such to engender its concrete “reality” (thereby identifying essence 
and appearance). Marx for his part demonstrates that, whereas in “reality” property 
appears to generate the alienation of labor, in theory, the relation is reversed: 
property is engendered by alienated labor. He is already engaged in reversing 
appearances, and as such he is already critical. Granted, the manuscripts are more 
or less sketches and are preponderantly concerned with the phenomenology, not 
the theory of labor; nonetheless, the methodology plotted out in the Introduction 
of 1857 is already operant.  
8. Retournement de Hegel (p.51-52) 
Continuing the argument, Lyotard rejects Althusser’s claim that in the 1844 
manuscripts, Marx takes bourgeois political economy at face value. To the 
contrary, Marx was therein engaged in overturning the problematic, concepts and 
system of the latter. To bring this out, Lyotard compares the manuscripts to the 
1843-44 Introduction of the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
(Marx, 2005). In the latter, alienation is not the index of something beneath 
appearances; it is the negative moment in a dialectic where subject and substance 
are identical. In the 1844 manuscripts Marx is already engaged in eliminating this 
identity, taking a decisive step forward by carrying the critique of mediation over 
to the Hegelian methodology itself. What is “alienation” in the manuscripts 
persists in the Introduction of 1857 as the indifference of labor; hence Marx is 
methodologically consistent.  
9. Gare à l’Histoire (p.53-54) 
Lyotard cites the fourth notebook of the Grundrisse as a more direct proof of 
Marx’s methodological consistency. He claims that the remarks on alienation 
demonstrate in a striking way the notebook’s parentage in the 1844 manuscripts. 
Marx makes a claim of considerable methodological importance here: that the 
underlying logic of capitalism is not to be sought in its history. He declares that 
“In order to develop the laws of bourgeois economy … it is not necessary to write 
the real history of the relations of production” (Marx, 1973). Far from suggesting 
however that there were no necessary or sufficient historical conditions for the 
formation of capitalism, Marx maintains that as such, they “leave the enigma of 
capital intact” (Lyotard’s phrase). As pre-capitalist conditions, by definition, they 
dissipate when they give way to capital. To this extent, the question of primitive 
accumulation, for example, is a red herring (a “false question” in Lyotard’s 
parlance) since plunder must be transformed into capital by properly capitalistic 
relations of production, and these are precisely what the history of plundering does 
not in itself explain. To this extent, Lyotard claims that historicism must be treated 
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as an “epistemological aberration” and that the Marxist theoretical system must be 
constructed as “entirely present.” 
10. Économie et religion (p.54-55) 
But Lyotard maintains that historicism is much more than a methodological error. 
It essentially amounts to bourgeois economics’ own perspective on capital, which 
is to say that it functions as “un-critiqued religion.” To liberal economics, 
capitalism is at once historical and eternal. This would be paradoxical but for the 
deeply Hegelian nature of liberal economics, as Marx understands it. For liberal 
economics capitalism is indeed historical, since pre-capitalist social formations are 
read as leading to capitalism. But it is also eternal, inasmuch as the pre-capitalist 
social formations are precisely that: pre-capitalist, i.e. moments on the road to 
capitalism. As such, capitalism has a history but it also figures as the natural – as 
opposed to the properly historical (i.e. contingent) – condition of economics. 
Lyotard reminds the reader of Hegel’s own forays into economics to show how he 
ceaselessly conceived of political economy in terms of a substantial dialectic. 
11. Critique de la plutodicée (p.55-56) 
To the uninitiated reader, Marx may appear to be confounding eternity with 
becoming. This is not so. First, he is opposing the historical character of capitalism in 
Marxist critique with its ahistorical (which is to say eternal or natural) character in 
the economic, speculative justification. Second, he is opposing the atemporal status 
of the critical system he intends to construct with the ontological becoming of the 
philosophical justification Hegel gives to Adam Smith. Hegel constructs a 
“plutodicy” (a theodicy of capital), justifying its present in the moments of the 
conceptual/historical path it has traced. Lyotard’s striking claim here is that Marx’s 
critique of political economy, precisely in seeking reversal, lines up with his critique 
of speculative philosophy. As such, “the methodological reversal of 1844 remains 
the nerve of the critique of political economy.” Just as Marx critiques the 
pretended justification of capitalism through the history of primitive accumulation 
(as pre-capitalist it neither explains nor justifies anything of capitalism, recall), he 
also reverses the subordination in capitalist production of living, creative labor to 
the dead labor that is accreted in the means of production. Just as speculative 
philosophy “bathes” in the death of the surpassed moment, capitalism’s alienation 
is the dominion of death over the living. 
12. Distance non dialectique (p.56-58) 
It is important to emphasize however that Marx offers no philosophy of “life” to 
recuperate the negativity of this dominion of death. Methodologically speaking, 
“The separation he introduces between the movement of reality and the 
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movement of the cognizance of reality is not dialectical.” As such, the reversal is 
not a moment, in the speculative sense, wherein through the labor of the negative, 
the concept or substance is reconciled to itself at last; rather, Marx’s thrust is 
purely critical, which is to say both demystifying and revolutionary. And inasmuch 
as it constructs the present “reality” as in some manner entirely self-sufficient – we 
might say, entirely self-present – the question is posed of a force which actively 
and at all times sustains it, operating at its heart in the production of wealth; a 
“puissance de richesse” as Lyotard puts it. Marx’s answer to this question is the 
concept of labor power. Lyotard notes that the language changes from “puissance 
de travail” (das Arbeitsvermögen) in the Grundrisse to “force de travail” (die 
Arbeitskraft) in Capital. This indicates that in the preparatory text especially, Marx 
views labor power as a creative energy internal to the capitalist system, a 
“puissance” or potential, propping it up and allowing it to reproduce (the shift 
undergone in Capital by contrast is to view it from the perspective of capital itself, 
i.e. as a constituent of capital and an element, a “force” in the general apparatus of 
production). With this note of caution in mind, Lyotard claims to have identified 
the third aspect of Marx’s critique. It has already a) emphasized the methodological 
untenability of explaining the present on the basis of the past, and b) shown how 
the historicization of capitalism is really a naturalization and therefore a 
justification. Now it must c) draw the practical political implications of this non-
dialectical reversal. These are not easily missed; if Marxism was indeed a 
substantial, dialectical critique, wherein knowledge was (or was to be) homogenous 
with its object (the aforementioned Hegelian illusion), then the contradiction 
between knowledge and “reality” – i.e. its “alienation” – would have to engender a 
“mediating instance” to “bandage and to think” it (“la panser et la penser”). Here 
we have hit a nerve: “Any dialectical philosophy of the relation of knowledge to 
experience gives birth to a ‘bureaucracy of the spirit’” operating on behalf of the 
dialectic. But the struggle against bureaucracy characterized Marx’s political 
engagement from the very beginning. As Lyotard puts it, “Any practice 
conforming to the critical reversal is non-dialectical. The question of revolutionary 
organization must be posed on the basis of this conclusion.” Contemporary 
Marxist parties – read, Althusser’s PCF – repeat the alienation of “reality” and of 
speculative discourse when they claim for themselves the bandaging-thinking 
prerogative. 
13. Le deuxième tour est le retournement (p.58-60) 
Lyotard now pinpoints the double present within Marxist discourse. The 
methodological reversal happens when, having plotted out all of capital’s present 
(i.e. properly capitalist) metamorphoses, theory follows it through the process of 
reproduction, i.e. the point at which it starts anew to expand. It is in this second 
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pass that theory becomes critical, taking its distance from its object and deducing 
therefrom the alienation of the worker – thus reversing the social given. In the first 
pass – the phenomenological, “naïve” tracking of capital’s present – capital 
appears as totally exterior to the worker. On the second pass, having gone through 
the M-C-M cycle, and having avowed that production is only possible on condition 
that its disparate elements are organized under living labor, theory unravels the 
tensions between capital’s elements and the occulted but decisive role of the 
worker in the production of value. What appeared as totally exterior to her is, 
theory demonstrates, the worker’s own product; hence, theory has demonstrated 
that “reality” is an inversion. “The veil has fallen” over the social given that 
philosophy has heretofore sought to justify, but theory now seeks to negate.  
14. L’aliénation en façade (p.60-61) 
Granted, it is from the perspective of labor, under the veil of the social given, that 
alienation is explicitly discussed. But far from having disappeared, it is precisely in 
1857-58, in the Grundrisse that alienation is given “its exact position with respect to 
theory.” As Lyotard puts it, “the immediate experience of exteriority indexes an 
inversion of the other side of the tableau.” Hence, the phenomenology of labor 
power which persists even in the Grundrisse necessitates a shift to the dispositif of 
Capital, which passes almost entirely to the substrate of the “things in themselves.” 
But Lyotard cautions us to remember that at the moment of writing the Grundrisse, 
Marx conceived of Capital as the first book of a larger work, the third volume of 
which was to have been devoted to salaried work. Here Lyotard makes a bold 
claim: it is “certain” that the analyses of the alienation of labor in the Grundrisse – 
not those of the 1844 manuscripts – would have been taken up again in Volume 
III.  
 
 
15. Le retournement est fait de deux déplacements rectangulaires (p.61-62)  
Lyotard cautions us that theory does not redress what is inverted in alienation. 
There is no real symmetry between the “real” and the theoretical; their relation is 
better envisioned as perpendicular – theory being at a right angle (or a left turn!) 
from “reality”. Recall that Lyotard in no way claims that alienation functions as a 
concept in the mature Marx’s theory; rather, it emerges in how theory operates, what 
it does – i.e. it is implicit in the critical right-angle that is taken on the second pass 
of the analysis of capital. Retrospectively, theory ascertains that alienation was 
already present in the first pass; hence the trajectory of critique passes by two 
rectangular displacements.   
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16. Le faux déplacement ou « progrès » (de l’aliénation) (p.62-63) 
Critique is never accomplished from within alienation, i.e. from within capital’s 
regime of exteriority, indifference and abstraction (compare the Lyotard of 
Libidinal Economy, who exhorts us to abandon critique, to “be inside and forget it”) 
(Lyotard, 1993). Granted, capital dissimulates “growth”, “development”, and 
“progress” – indicative of a certain critical traction if not a self-critique. But in 
reality, capital repeats itself without displacing itself. What occurs under capitalism is 
actually the perpetual expansion of the reproduction of capital, which is to say the 
extension of alienation over the entire social field. “Progress” under expanded 
alienation indexes the disappearance of the creative act of labor from more and 
more sectors of life, rendering it increasingly present only by its felt absence.  
17. Critique de la critique de la dialectique substantielle (p.63-67) 
Alienation is therefore indeed a “trace”, indicating that something has been lost. 
But this something is not a “good” negativity (“that of the spirit, or labor”) that 
has been obstructed by a “bad” one (“that of capital, of commodity fetishism, of 
reification”). Such a reading would be religious, Hegelian (the Marxism of Herbert 
Marcuse, popular at the time Lyotard was writing, serves as an example). Lyotard 
reads the 1844 manuscripts as an expression of Marx’s struggle against this 
tendency, pinpointing the principle of “the creation of Man by Man” as a 
complement to the method of reversal. Essentially, the young Marx is prefiguring 
the method of the Grundrisse, which “refuses to engender the world from the non-
world (God) just as it refuses to engender capital from non-capital.” He draws 
therefrom the distinction between communism and socialism – communism being 
to socialism what atheism is to “real life”, i.e. a negation of an alienation (private 
property or religion, respectively). Lyotard grants that with this notion of “real 
life”, Marx has not quite left philosophy – but the way out is clearly indicated. If in 
1844 his critique of religion results in a Feuerbachian Protestantism of the sensible, 
by 1845 in the Theses on Feuerbach he realizes that such a discourse is itself religious. 
One cannot simply pass from a discourse of mediation to a discourse that is 
mediation without redoubling and edifying “reality”. All discourse, even that of 
1844, is “outside” of reality in some sense; the point is to ensure that its position on 
the outside is critical, reversing. To properly reverse “reality”, to treat it critically, 
requires a double operation: 1) the reversal of what is alienated, i.e. inverted in 
“reality”, and then 2) construction of theoretical system rendering alienation and 
the possibility of its reversal intelligible.  
18. Une question (p.67) 
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Theory does not ultimately stand in a dialectical relation to the symptomatic reality 
which is its referent, at least if we take “dialectical” in the religious (Hegelian or 
hermeneutic) sense. The Marxist canon does not of itself tear the veil of alienated 
consciousness away from workers. On the contrary, “Marxist theory” can be 
successfully deployed in the perpetuation of alienation; witness on this count 
official Soviet diamat, and the history of Bolshevism after the revolution. The 
question therefore arises: does the worker have to descend herself to the substrate 
of alienated production, to learn from scratch and in situ the truths articulated in 
theory? If so, where and how can this be achieved? Above all, the practical reversal 
(i.e. the reversal in practice) clearly rules out mediation. But this entails a Marxism 
with no Party, and Lyotard must now reckon with the Party’s leading theoretician.  
Section 3 
19. Un marxisme apolitique (p.68-70) 
Thus we hit upon the point of Lyotard’s reflection: to identify Althusser’s 
mishandling of alienation, and the theoretical and practical consequences that 
ensue. Althusser’s intervention regarding alienation was in response to the 
publication of the nineteenth volume of the Recherches internationales à la lumière du 
marxisme, devoted to the young Marx. His indignation at the journal’s “future 
anterior” method of reading the young Marx – according to which the early 
writings find retroactive theoretical justification in the mature works – is 
understandable, since this is precisely the method of Hegelian idealism. But as 
Lyotard points out, Althusser’s tracing of the epistemological break has de facto the 
same consequences, negating the theoretical value of the early writings. This has 
far-reaching effects on Althusser’s Marxism: he leaves the theory of practical 
politics largely untouched. And for Althusser, the rejection of the Hegelian 
dialectic goes hand in hand with the rejection of the concept of an organic social 
totality and its expression. This means that the superstructure never organically 
expresses the contradiction in the economic base, and in fact maintains a certain 
autonomy with respect to it. As such, a change of the economic base – a 
revolution in the structure – in no way guarantees a comparable revolution in the 
superstructure. It can even, to the contrary, reactivate atavistic elements; hence, 
Althusser theorizes the possibility of Stalinism. Lyotard detects here a Hegelian 
residue, a discourse of the redemption of the negative moment of Stalinism – and 
hence, a “bureaucratodicée” (a bureaucro-theodicy). In any case, Althusser forces 
us to choose between Hegel on one hand, and the permanent installation of 
politics in the bureaucratic and bureaucratizing superstructure on the other. 
Lacking Marx’s concept of alienation, he has installed Marxist politics – largely 
neglected – in a thoroughly alienated terrain and handed it over to a thoroughly 
alienating mediator. 
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20. La théorie et l’arme (p.70-72) 
But what of Althusser’s theory? One mustn’t forget that Marx’s work – including 
the theoretical – is not just a text, but also a weapon. When Althusser invites us to 
“read Capital,” the risk is that we read capitalism, leaving the referent intact – and 
indeed the question hangs over his work of who will annihilate it, and how, and why. 
This speaks to Althusser’s segregation of theory from politics, which produces the 
very periodization in the preface to For Marx according to which Marx matures by 
passing from ideology to science. Lyotard argues, against Althusser, that Marx 
indeed starts in political critique, but in fact never leaves this start; the State persists in 
the theoretical field, in the mature sketches, as an object of future critique. But 
inasmuch as it was only ever a start, Marxists must move on from the provisional 
terminology of superstructure and atavism. To be a (politically active) Marxist 
today is to go beyond the text and to track so as to reverse the role of the State in 
the expansion of alienation, not to perpetuate it by situating politics in the 
superstructure.  
21. Marx enragé (p.72-74) 
Lyotard turns to the young Marx’s critique of the Prussian bureaucracy to 
substantiate the preceding claims. Though remaining ideological (passing from a 
liberal to a Left-Hegelian mode), the critiques of 1842-43 position the State as an 
exteriorized and exteriorizing apparatus of mediation. Thereby, regardless of their 
ideological trappings, the early critiques hit upon something essential about 
bureaucracies: rather than truly suppressing or resolving the contradictions they are 
called to mediate, they repeat them without displacing them. One detects in the 
words of the young, enraged Marx the desire to escape from the Hegelianism 
trapping him and holding back the critique; the violence of the form of his 
discourse strains towards a properly critical violence of position.  
22. La médiation, c’est-à-dire l’Église, c’est-à-dire l’État (p.74-77) 
While Marx’s early critique remains mired in the Hegelian text and the phenomenal 
social field, it nonetheless latches onto objectivized and alienated “mediation” as 
its target – going so far as to attack the very essence of mediation itself. Marx 
indeed undertakes a critique of Hegelian “contradiction” as such, but devotes 
particular attention to the Prussian intellectual bureaucracy – for example the 
censors. He asks: if the State is the truth of society, then why must it secrete a 
distinct intellectual class to safeguard society from press writers like him, and thus 
moderate between society and its own supposed truth? Lyotard suggests that the 
weak point the speculative system – the necessity of the negative moment and of 
mediation – is here incarnate. But Marx goes even further: inasmuch as the censor 
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is not immediately the State, but rather a mediator, the censor-State relation 
presumably requires its own speculative guarantee – i.e. a super-censor. But this 
raises the same problem anew, and the need for mediation stretches on ad infinitum. 
Marx has here hit upon a defining feature of bureaucracy: it grows both 
peripherally, permeating ever new areas of the social surface, as well as 
“pyramidally”, deferring the “anarchy” that threatens it to ever higher levels of 
management. The mediator can never really mediate its contradiction, being 
foreign to both elements, so the next best thing is to repeat the contradiction – 
without thereby displacing or reversing it – at a higher bureaucratic level. It remains to 
Marx, in 1843, to a) draw the explicit link between bureaucracy and religion, and b) 
displace the position of his own critique. He begins to learn that Hegel is not to 
blame for the “absurdity or immorality” of bureaucratic repetition, but rather, that 
“reality” is. Hegel does not justify the Prussian State so much as the latter achieves 
its own justification through Hegel’s theory – and this necessitates a 
methodological shift of focus.  
23. Position (de pouvoir) du discours de savoir (p.77-80) 
Marx thus engages in “exiting the text”, or rather, turning from the texts of the 
philosophers to the “text” of immediate, “material” practice. Turning Hegel on his 
head is insufficient, and in fact perpetuates mystification as we saw with 
Feuerbach. If in The German Ideology Marx turned our gaze from the sky to the 
Earth, in The Critique of Political Economy he insists we plumb the Earth for the 
basement. The idea is to first turn from Hegelian and Left-Hegelian discourse to 
the “reality” that it really speaks, but then to turn from this “reality” to what is 
really undergirding it. The second turn is, properly, the reversal sought by Marxist 
theory. But how then does politics figure into this new program of reversal – the 
critique of bureaucracy in particular? Here Marx and Engels “hesitate”.  
 
24. L’État du XIXe siècle et les survivances (p.80-81) 
The hesitations of Marx and Engels on the State flow from the evident 
“hesitations” of actual nineteenth century states. The properly political analyses of 
Marx and Engels took place in a situation of long transition. They witnessed the 
destruction of pre-capitalist forms of political power and authority, but also the 
need, on the part of the new ruling capitalist class, not to sweep the old order away 
too quickly or radically and thus throw the landed classes, the guilds and the 
peasantry into the struggle on the side of the burgeoning proletariat. In this 
conjuncture of conflict (which is not to say contradiction), the State functions as a 
compromise formation. The (nineteenth century) State is at once superstructural, 
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and overdetermined: obeying capital “in the last instance” but tarrying with pre-
capitalist atavisms (“survivances”). Lyotard reminds us of the need for patient, 
precise “phenomenological” readings of “real” situations, and in particular, the 
need to reconstruct alienation as it functions today, so that our theoretical present 
constitutes the theory not of the nineteenth century but of the present moment. 
25. L’intégration (p.81-84) 
Alienation today describes a much greater number of “local social experiences” 
than it did in Marx’s time. The schema of a “realized abstraction” now extends 
beyond productive labor to the fabric of everyday life, and the individual now 
finds herself an outsider even in those relations to which she nominally belongs 
(think here, to bring Lyotard’s analysis up to date, of Facebook and the like.). But 
since the false universality of alienation extends further than it did previously, so 
does the possibility of theoretical construction. In fact the possibility (the 
necessity) of more comprehensive and wider-reaching theoretical elaboration is 
already indicated in the Grundrisse, where Marx explains how the expanded 
reproduction of capitalism incorporates, transforms and eliminates non-capitalist 
atavisms. He demonstrates therein how the expansion of reproduction entails the 
efflorescence of new social symptoms, a superficial diversity indicating and 
demanding the articulation of a generalized alienation keeping step with capital. 
Marx is guided by the theme of alienation in tracking capital’s “progress”. And 
today, we might continue – retaining the concept of alienation in our analysis of a 
sociological condition wherein knowledge, in the form of information, has become 
a productive force in its own right. 
26. Déplacement de l’État (p.84-87) 
Here the reader glimpses an embryonic version of Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition more than a decade before its publication. Expanding reproduction now 
annihilates atavistic social forms rather than striking a compromise between them 
at the superstructural level. Favoring abstraction, it models science upon the 
general schema of alienation, scuttling the scientist to the margins or specialized 
ghettoes of her vocation while externalizing and accreting knowledge in scientific 
instruments (and, as Lyotard will emphasize in 1979: data banks). The political 
sphere undergoes the same general process. Whereas the State once struck an 
uneasy compromise between atavisms and the new capitalist class, its function has 
utterly changed. It now manages a “synchronous, simultaneous complexity”, an 
opaque, alienated social mass subordinated to the needs of expanded reproduction. 
The State’s role becomes quite simply to manage and ensure capital’s expansion, 
subordinating through its organs the various social spheres and submitting them to 
instrumental reason and the law of value. The political class becomes an expert 
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class, i.e. an increasingly specialized management class. Its allegiance to expanded 
reproduction trumps even the “sacred” institutions of bourgeois capitalism, such 
as private property. If the latter obstructs the expansion of reproduction, it is 
possible that the political class may regulate or abolish it as in actually existing 
socialist regimes. Through a kind of ruse of capitalist reason, “socialist” 
bureaucracies accomplish precisely the logic of expanded reproduction (Lyotard 
speaks of the USSR, but think here especially of China since the 1980s). In sum, 
we see the main outlines of Lyotard’s later analysis of sociological postmodernity: 
the hegemony of instrumental reason (what he later terms “system”, “complexity”, 
“development”, “technoscience”), the utter transformation of science and 
knowledge, and the shift from antagonistic politics to perpetual development-
management. 
27. Ce que cet État médiatise en principe (p.88-89) 
Lyotard adds precision to this critique of the modern capitalist state. The latter has 
undergone a double transformation since Marx’s time. First, it has become 
increasingly conflated with the dominant class. Recall that the latter is essentially a 
management class, and therefore its legitimacy is grounded in its ability to facilitate 
expanded reproduction. This “State-class” however, to the extent that it 
successfully unfetters reproduction through the elimination of atavisms, also 
comes increasingly to resemble the society it ostensibly governs. First, the new 
bureaucracy is a moment of the reproduction of capital, obeying the same 
imperatives and the same general laws. To this extent, the contradictions of the 
latter come to characterize it as well. An expanding alienation characterizes the 
bureaucracy and its labor dispositif through and through, and this generates the 
paradoxical need for an in principle limitless set of meta-bureaucracies. But 
second, the particular relation in which the bureaucracy stands with respect to the 
society it manages is itself an alienated one. It poses itself as capable of the 
management it cannot effectuate without reproducing itself at ever high levels, 
adding the figure of a “strange, impotent mediator” to the alienated landscape of 
late capitalism. Marx already said as much in his early critique of the Prussian 
bureaucracy, essentially describing a situation in which the difference between state 
and “civil society” tended to disappear.  
28. L’aliénation et l’exploitation (p.89-92) 
But does the expansion of alienation, the penetration of capitalism into activities 
heretofore “relatively independent” from infrastructure entail that these have 
become proleterianized? That is, not just salaried but producing surplus value as 
well? Note that exploitation is a concept of the theoretical system; we don’t “see” 
it in the social field (though Lyotard will admit, in section 30 below, that it can 
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subsist as a “diffuse feeling” in bureaucratic capitalism). Far from becoming more 
visible with the expansion of alienation, exploitation actually becomes more and 
more hidden (in order to be charitable to Lyotard here, we must allow that we can 
“feel” exploitation without ever “seeing” it). An important ideological function of 
the State becomes apparent: to further mediate between the worker and her 
product, obscuring the exploitation that was more brazen (yet unseen) in the free 
market. Noting that capital is indifferent to the “material” or “immaterial” nature 
of the product, Lyotard turns to the teaching profession for an exemplary 
illustration of how exploitation emerges but is obscured under capital’s expansion 
– which is to say, under the expansion of alienation.  
29. Apparition et occultation simultanées de l’exploitation de l’enseignant (p.92-95) 
Education becomes wage labor under capitalism. But when, subsequently, it 
becomes a free and universal public service through “nationalization” or 
“collectivization”, does this mean that the parasitic middle-man – the capitalist – 
has been cut out of the equation? Is the pedagogical relationship now unmediated? 
The answer is no; it remains alienated and exploitative, though the level of 
exploitation, even to an approximation, cannot be quantified. Recall that in the 
advanced bureaucratic capitalism Lyotard describes, the classical boss gives way to 
the State-boss. In education, the dominant State-class, rather than the individual 
capitalist, comes to appropriate the surplus value created by teachers (i.e. for the 
purpose of the state or national budget). Effectively, the State-boss sells a product 
to families, though the sale is masked (as taxation). Owing to this dissimulation, 
and added to the immateriality of the teacher’s product, it is “impossible” to pin 
down exactly how much the teacher has produced (and therefore how much she 
has been exploited), but two (unquantifiable) relations broadly characterize her 
labour: a) the educational infrastructure stands as constant capital and b) the 
educated student is what she produces. The analogy with industrial production, 
with its alienation and its exploitation, is firm – except that the “material” shaped 
by the teacher – students – may temporarily and locally enter into cooperation 
with her to challenge the economic norms of the pedagogical relationship (e.g. 
Lyotard organizing at Nanterre). 
30. Brouillage de l’exploitation dans la hiérarchie (p.95-98)  
Not only the rate but the place of exploitation becomes blurred under bureaucratic 
capitalism. Exploitation comes to permeate the bureaucracy itself. To continue 
with the example of the educational sector, the emergence of a fine-grained salary 
hierarchy contributes to the impossibility of discerning, phenomenologically 
speaking, between redistributed surplus value and the remunerated value of labor 
power. All that remains is a “diffuse feeling of exploitation” and no one knows 
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where to discharge it, since the clearly defined capitalist boss is gone and everyone 
in the hierarchy seems similarly if variably exploited. In a society tending 
increasingly toward the expanded reproduction of capital this becomes the norm, 
since more and more social labor time is expended in the production of the 
instruments of production by multiple, specialized and variously salaried laborers.  
31. Éliminer la médiation pratique (p.98-101) 
In sum, the economic bureaucracy under expanding reproduction a) redistributes a 
part of the total surplus value and b) exteriorizes production to itself through 
mediation (i.e. management). It remains to discuss how c) workers’ own organs of 
struggle become bureaucratized, which is to say alienated. Labor unions are well 
known to be more or less alienating structures, but it is in the revolutionary 
political party that the inversion of worker self-organization into bureaucracy finds 
its fullest expression. In fact, the thoroughgoing alienation of the worker from the 
Party bears all the hallmarks of Prussian bureaucracy critiqued by Marx in 1842-43. 
Here we return to Lyotard’s distinction between the content of a discourse and its 
position: the “real” position from which the communist parties speak belies the 
inverse of what they actually say. This is rendered possible when the distance of 
reversal, i.e. critical distance, is not maintained between speech and its object; 
bureaucratization and the abandonment of practical critique go hand in hand. A 
revolutionary party which installs itself in the “reality” of capitalism buys into the 
reality principle of expanded reproduction and the law of value; witness on this 
count the many contemporary “Leftist” parties running on platforms of managing 
the neoliberal crisis, creating jobs, etc. Even in invoking its status as the party of 
the workers, the Communist Party betrays its alienated status; nothing is to be 
hoped for from the worker on the terrain of “reality”, i.e. as a registered voter, and 
the invocation of “the proletariat” is in this sense a religious residue. The claim to 
“represent” or “express” the will of the working class, in an alienated “reality”, 
amounts to a blandly statistical, non-critical claim. What is missing in this flat 
political space is the properly critical practice of plumbing the layers of Party-
worker hierarchy to provoke reversal.  
32. La critique pratique et la provocation (p.101-103) 
What then is the practical critique? From the first, fourth, eighth and third theses 
on Feuerbach, Lyotard reconstructs a double relation between theory and practice. 
On one hand, revolutionary practice “constitutes the truth of theory.” On the 
other, practice and theory are “parallel,” doubling each other. That theory doubles 
practice while practice resolves theory may sound paradoxical. But as we have seen, 
the theoretical substrate indicates privileged “regions of reversal”, or “critical 
regions” on the social surface. In other words, theory uncovers reality’s alienated 
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nature while mapping relations of production; critical practice, for its part, 
“provokes … the basement [substrate] into rising to the surface,” i.e. accomplishes 
in the social sphere the reversal that theory maps out. Lyotard gives three examples 
(“real or imagined”) to illustrate this practical-critical function. One of these 
echoes his organizing at Nanterre: the student movement attacks the university 
and the “culture” it promotes, goading the intellectual bureaucracy into showing its 
true colors and thereby reversing it in practice. Supposedly a neutral, non-partisan 
institution, the university becomes repressive in the face of student-professor 
contestation, thereby demonstrating its true place in the system: an ideological alibi 
for capitalism, and a workshop for the self-perpetuation of the bureaucracy.  
 
 
33. La sobriété pratique (p.103-105) 
There is no question of building upon such practical interventions, since this would 
imply a memory-in-the-“real”, embodied in a mediating-edifying revolutionary 
Party. Any such organization, however novel it appears, is always the same (and 
reproduces the same). As such, Lyotard counsels abandoning hope in overcoming, 
through the mediation of a Party, the contradiction between the law of value and 
the creative power of labor. Strictly speaking, there isn’t even any contradiction 
between “reality” and its substrate, since the two orders are radically distinct (i.e. 
inversions; the presence of “reality” entails the occultation of the substrate, not a 
tension between them). The only real contradiction – which is far from substantial, 
Hegelian – is that of “a system which counts everything in terms of labor time, and 
which reduces this time as much as it can to raise the rate of relative surplus 
value.” And while this produces symptoms all over the social surface, and indeed 
many an opportunity for practical-critical reversal, it offers no guarantee of a final 
catastrophe that could do away with capitalism. In practice, all this means that 
practical critique of the system undertaken by workers and students rests neither 
upon a substantial dialectic, nor upon knowledge or know-how accumulated and 
safeguarded outside of itself. Lyotard rejects here the religious tendency of 
putatively Marxist organizations that aim to resolve the alienation at the surface 
through textual study and the formation of a community of believers; in this sense, 
true faith in Marx entails the adoption of his critical “temperance”, which always 
and everywhere warns against the collapse of revolutionary practice into religious 
modes of congregation, hierarchy, and text-worship. Texts, even Marxist ones, 
should only ever be used critically; Althusser’s “return to Marx,” too bookish, is 
implicitly targeted here. Revolutionary pedagogy is critical – which is to say 
practical – or it is nothing.  
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IV. Summary 
Let us recapitulate, paring down the preceding exegesis to the bare essentials.  
Althusser does not grasp, or suppresses, the critical nature of the discourse-
object relation in Marx’s theory. That is, he fails to see that it is not a positive 
knowledge, but rather negates its object through reversal. Discounting alienation as a 
Hegelian holdover in the young Marx, Althusser does not see that it persists in the 
mature works as a schema and a quasi-deictic. But alienation is in fact essential to 
Marx’s theory (and properly Marxist practice) because of its indexing function in the 
theory-object relation.  
Lyotard does not dispute alienation’s absence, qua explicit concept, from 
Marx’s mature works. Nonetheless, he maintains that it is operant if tacit throughout. 
Prefigured in the early works and sketched in the Grundrisse, it is operant and readable 
precisely in the way that the later critique of capital proceeds. Marx digs through layers of 
ideology to articulate the “reality” of the social given (starting finally in Capital, as is 
well known, with the phenomenon of the commodity) in order to suss out its 
immanent negation. Metaphorically, he passes from sky, to earth, to basement. Or: he 
reverses ideology to uncover “reality”, which must be reversed by theory (and critical 
practice). Against Althusser’s periodization of Marx in terms of epistemological 
breaks, Lyotard paints the real shift in Marx’s handling of alienation as a shift from its 
location at the level of philosophy and the phenomenological subject to the level of 
“real” social relations. In other words, if “alienation” designates something which 
happens in discourse and/or to the phenomenological subject, a concept that is at 
once an experience, then it is indeed absent from the mature Marx. But that’s not to 
say that alienation per se is absent. For Lyotard, Marx’s retention of an operant notion 
if not an explicit theoretical concept of alienation boils down to the practice of 
articulating-negating certain indices, certain over-determined nodes in the structure of 
the social given, which point to the immanent (if by no means dialectically guaranteed) 
possibility of a reversal.  
 Althusser’s error – his failure to acknowledge the essentially critical function of 
Marxist discourse and the persistence of alienation – has immediate practical 
consequences: namely, his support for the alienated and alienating “bureaucracy of the 
spirit” against the spontaneous critical-practice of workers and students. Because he 
does not take the proper measure of alienation and its relation to critical practice, 
Althusser remains mired in a dialectic of mediation, still too Hegelian, wherein the 
Party reserves for itself the role of scientific and political vanguard. Lyotard, in 1973, 
chalks Althusserianism up to a “resurgence of Stalinism” and a brandishing of 
scientificity as a guarantee of infallibility “exactly as in Jdanov’s day” (Lyotard, 1973). 
He suggests that this bureaucratization of the revolution is, precisely, an alienation; 
27
McLennan and McDougall: Adrift of Alienation
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
 
 
 
building itself upon the ground occupied by capital, repeating without displacing the 
alienation of workers, Althusser’s PCF is doomed at best to manage the expanded 
reproduction of capital better than the openly capitalist parties would,5 and at worst – 
but this goes hand in hand – to brazenly obstruct practical-critical uprisings.6 The 
Party can bluster all it wants about the overthrow of capitalism, but its very position is 
non-critical, counter-revolutionary, playing into the hands of capital. Failing to take 
the proper measure of alienation, Althusser perpetuates it. Note however that to his 
credit – in 1969, the very year of Lyotard’s critique – Althusser will identify the PCF 
as an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), and thus as to some extent complicit in the 
reproduction of capitalism (Althusser, 2014). 
Like Althusser, Lyotard is no believer in the historical necessity of communist 
revolution; capitalist social formulations are pregnant with their own dissolution only 
to the extent that we can hit upon the right moment (as per Lenin). But this moment 
is made, rendered possible precisely through the a-chronological work of theoretical 
elaboration. And it is not made by a Party, but by the workers and students 
themselves.  
 
V. Deeper Continuities   
 It remains then to draw up a succinct balance sheet of interest in Lyotard’s 
dispute with Althusser, from the perspective of an ongoing reassessment of the place 
of Lyotard’s militant writings in the larger corpus.  
 Pagès’s text on Lyotard and alienation, which McLennan has reviewed 
elsewhere,7 tracks the changing fortunes of the concept through his corpus. While 
largely mute on the connection between alienation and Lyotard’s use of the sublime, 
the picture she paints is overall compelling. Up to and including the Althusser dispute, 
as Pagès reconstructs him, we see Lyotard striving to overcome alienation. In the 
Althusser dispute, at any rate, he seeks to do so by means of reversal – and for reasons 
we have already seen, never cumulatively, nor once and for all, but rather tactically 
and perpetually. But by the end of his life, Lyotard is anchoring his political practice 
(minimal and formally negative though it is – see McLennan, 2013) on a constitutive, 
irremediable alienation couched in linguistic, affective and Freudian terms. What is 
fascinating about the dispute with Althusser is its hinge function. In our interpretation 
                                                           
5 In this connection, the reader might be interested in Jean Baudrillard’s recently translated The Divine 
Left: A Chronicle of the Years 1977-1984 (Semiotext(e), 2014). 
6 See Jacques Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson (London and New York: Continuum, 2011). 
7 Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy -  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française, Vol XX, 
No 1 (2012) pp 134-137. 
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it is here that Lyotard clearly begins to anchor his politics in an antihumanistic account 
of alienation.8  
The account of alienation in the Althusser dispute is “antihumanistic”, on our 
reading, on account of how it decentres (without abolishing) the phenomenology of 
labor. As in Althusser, the theoretical, broadly construed, is detached from the human 
– i.e. it is not coextensive with it; it neither defines it, nor is it achieved by it. 
Alienation is not, to repeat, an experience that is simultaneously a concept; it is, rather, 
a schema and a quasi-deictic that more properly takes shape in the activity of theory 
and critical practice. The human subject is not achieved through alienation; it is, rather, 
seized by it, perhaps even constituted while undone by it in the painful possibility of 
reversal. 
The later Lyotard will variously construe precisely this seizure/undoing of the human 
in various terms: “differend”,9 “passibility to the event”,10 “affect-phrase”11 and the 
like. Compare for example the account of alienation in the Althusser dispute with the 
following description of the differend, in the book of the same name: “The differend 
is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to 
be put into phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which is a negative 
phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle possible. This state is 
signaled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: ‘One cannot find the words’, etc.” 
(Lyotard, 1988). While shifting to a linguistic-pragmatic register, the concept of 
something that is negatively present, troubling to the surface from some non-place 
persists. Following Pagès, it is therefore by no means a stretch to construe the 
differend in terms of alienation. What shifts however is the notion of reversibility. 
The postmodern and late Lyotard favours the intractability of the differend, of the 
affect-phrase and the like; it is no longer a question of reversing alienation but of 
bearing witness to it, of insisting upon its capacity to jam, however ephemerally, the 
cogs of instrumental reason.12 
The critique of Althusser is therefore instructive because it articulates alienation 
as the conceptually independent – read antihumanistic, not subject-dependent – index 
of a reality in need of reversal. But who – or what – “needs” this reversal? Certainly 
not reality itself; too Hegelian. The subject, then? If not her worn-out organization, 
then the worker herself? Lyotard has one foot in his past, inasmuch as alienation 
retains a properly critical function; he is still to the left of Althusser, accusing him of 
Stalinism from a nominally Marxist perspective. But he has one foot in the future, to 
                                                           
8 There also being glimmers in his recently published 1964 lectures, Pourquoi philosopher? 
9 Cf Lyotard, The Differend. 
10 Cf. Lyotard, The Inhuman. 
11 Cf. Lyotard, Misère de la philsophie.  
12 Cf. McLennan, 2013.  
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the extent that alienation’s force – its capacity to trouble, to demand reversal – resides 
not in the consciousness of the worker, or the workers’ instantiation in the Party, but 
rather in the objective (dis-)economy of a practical/theoretical dispositif. In a word: 
alienation is a signal of the differend, the radical misfire between pragmatic registers. 
In later writings, the force of this signal is not such that it can demand, in good 
conscience, a theoretical and practical reversal. But it persists as the index of where 
the smooth, post-political functioning of what he variously calls “system”, 
“technoscience”, “development” or “complexification” breaks down.  
In this connection, finally, it is worth noting how Lyotard’s later anchorage in 
something like an intractable, non-reversible alienation bespeaks the Freudian 
influence that was already at play in the Althusser dispute, indicated by the language 
of indexes, symptoms, over-determinations and compromise formations. The 
manifestation of this influence persists, episodically, until Lyotard’s death, and 
perhaps the seeds of his later conservatism – his militancy of intractability rather than 
reversibility – are already planted in the Althusser dispute. Recall that throughout his 
career, Freud himself was basically conservative with respect to the therapeutic 
possibilities inherent in psychoanalysis;13 it is essentially a palliative, and in spite of the 
efforts of later interpreters on the Freudian Left like Reich and Marcuse, he sketches 
no erotic utopia. While no utopian himself, Lyotard takes a key departure from Freud 
in the Althusser dispute; symptoms speak to underlying blockages of energy which 
must be set off, conducted, ignited (rather than interminably worked upon, “worked 
through”, Durcharbeitung to use the terminology Lyotard will later borrow from Freud). 
There is a normativity absent in Freud, but which Lyotard struggles to articulate and 
never does manage to articulate (McLennan, 2011). It is a short step from here to the 
purely voluntaristic, unashamedly capitalistic accelerationism of Libidinal Economy, 
which eschews the normative question. As is well known, Lyotard took a step back 
from the libidinal philosophy, calling it a “façon de parler” – a “way of speaking” 
(Lyotard, 1977) – and returned to the normative question. But when Freud returns in 
the later writings, it is not as a philosopher of energetic possibility, but of 
intractability.14  
 The dispute with Althusser, then, is instructive because it displays Lyotard’s 
struggle to articulate the proper relation between theory and practice on the basis of 
alienation, and an early staging of a Freudian politics of intractability. For the later 
                                                           
13 As Freud puts it to an imaginary interlocutor in the early Studies on Hysteria: “No doubt fate would 
find it easier than I do to remove you from your illness. But you will be able to convince yourself 
that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common 
unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against that 
unhappiness.” (Breuer and Freud 1978: 393) 
14 Cf. Heidegger and the Jews and Misère de la philosophie.  
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Lyotard, theoretical (as well as e.g. artistic) intervention is political practice; however it 
retains a certain militant if not critical function in its insistence upon endlessly 
jamming the system of technoscientific development, in rear-guard and melancholic 
struggle, by bearing witness to the irremediable intractability – the alienation, perhaps 
– of the human.  
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